How to Value Banks With No Dividends: The PNLF.IDX Problem Explained

Question:
I noticed that when the dividend payout ratio is 0%, the formula breaks—what should I do? And could you also look at PNLF? The bank never pays dividends and just parks the capital, which keeps ROE around 5% and P/BV extremely low, yet many investors buy it simply because it screens cheap on P/BV

Answer:
Yeah, PNLF is a perfect example of why “cheap PBV” on its own can be a trap.

Let me walk through it using actual numbers and your framework.


1. What PNLF actually looks like

From the latest 2024 data:

  • Net profit 2024: ~Rp 1.66T
  • Equity: ~Rp 65.1T
  • ROE: ~2.6%
  • BVPS: ~Rp 2,034
  • Share price: ~Rp 312
  • PBV: ~0.15×

Historically, ROE was a bit higher but still low: around 5–7% in 2020–2022.

Dividends:

  • Long-term: basically no regular dividend, with only tiny / occasional payments.

So your description is spot on:

  • Huge equity base,
  • Low ROE,
  • Almost no cash returned to shareholders,
  • Very low PBV (~0.15x).

2. What your justified P/B model says

In your framework, the key is:

\text{Fair P/B} = \frac{\text{ROE} - g}{\text{CoE} - g}

For a company that never pays dividends and just piles up assets, there are two problems:

  1. If payout ~ 0%, then g ≈ ROE (book keeps compounding at ROE).
  2. ROE is way below any reasonable CoE in Indonesia (say 12–15%).

Take a conservative example:

  • ROE = 5%
  • CoE = 12%
  • Payout = 0 ⇒ g ≈ 5%

Then:

\text{Fair P/B} = \frac{5\% - 5\%}{12\% - 5\%} = 0

Mathematically: if a company keeps all the money and reinvests forever at a return below CoE, it destroys value every year. The Gordon formula says the equity is only worth liquidation value → P/B tends to zero, not to 1x.

That’s why your formula “blows up” when payout is low or zero: it’s telling you this is not a good business to compound inside.

So:

PNLF’s very low PBV is consistent with low ROE and no payout.
It might be “cheap”, but it is also quite possibly a value trap.


3. How to think about a stock like this

For something like PNLF, you really have two angles:

A. Ongoing-business view (your justified P/B)

  • ROE structurally low (2–7%)
  • CoE high-ish (Indonesia risk)
  • Payout ≈ 0

→ On a pure economic basis, justified P/B is far below 1x, maybe even close to 0 in the extreme case. A PBV of 0.15× can be fair if the market believes:

  • ROE will stay low,
  • Cash will never be paid out or used well,
  • And governance won’t change.

In that world, people buying just because “PBV 0.15x must be cheap!” are missing the point: book value is being badly used.

B. “Cash box / holding company” view (sum-of-the-parts)

PNLF is really a holding company: big stakes in Panin Bank and Panin Dai-ichi Life plus other investments.

An alternative way to value it:

  1. Mark its assets to market:
    • Market value of its listed stakes,
    • Fair value of bonds / cash / other assets.
  2. Subtract debt and other liabilities.
  3. Divide by shares ⇒ look-through NAV per share.
  4. Compare current price to NAV ⇒ that gives you a holding-company discount.

If NAV per share is, say, Rp 2,000 and the stock is 300, that’s an 85% discount… but if management never returns the value (no dividends, no buybacks, no spin-off), the discount can stay huge for years. That’s governance risk, not pure finance.

So the key question isn’t “Is PBV 0.15x cheap?”
It’s: “Is there any realistic catalyst that forces/encourages them to use the capital better or return it?”


4. How I’d treat PNLF in your model

Purely from a modelling perspective (not advice):

  1. Don’t plug 0% payout into your terminal justified P/B formula.
    That assumes a healthy, shareholder-friendly steady state which clearly doesn’t exist.
  2. Either:
    • Use your justified P/B with a low ROE and a positive long-term payout that you think might happen in some future scenario (e.g. 30–40%), then heavily probability-weight that scenario, or
    • Treat PNLF more like a discount-to-NAV governance story and not a normal bank.
  3. When you see:
    • ROE < CoE,
    • Payout ≈ 0,
    • Controlling family with no history of sharing value…
    then your model is basically saying: “This is cheap for a reason.”

5. Bottom line (in plain language)

  • Your PBV/ROE/CoE framework is exactly what exposes why PNLF is tricky.
  • Low PBV alone doesn’t make it attractive if:
    • management hoards capital,
    • returns are permanently low,
    • and there’s no path to change.

Conceptually:

PNLF is the kind of stock where the business economics and governance can fully justify a deep discount to book, even if that looks “crazy cheap” on a screen.

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